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Some Specific Problems Raised by
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code in Ohio
Lawrence J. Burns
Between the date the Uniform Commercial Code was signed by the
governor of Ohio as the final step in its promulgation' and the date upon
which it went into effect2 some fourteen months elapsed. The purpose
of this delay was to enable those affected by the adoption of the Code
sufficient time to become familiar with its provisions.
Once the Code was signed by the governor, little time was lost by
interested groups in examining its contents. Lawyers, bankers, credit
men, and other interested
groups immediately
began
THE AuTHOR (B.S., LLB., Ohio State Univerholding discussions and semisity) is a practicing attorney in Columbus,
Ohio. He is Legislative Counsel for the Ohio
Bankers Association and has been active in the
promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code
in Ohio.

nars on the subject matter of

the new law.3 It soon became
apparent that some problems
had come into existence with
the adoption of the Code. Considering the size and scope of the act and the amount of study and discussion devoted to it both before and since its adoption, it is a tribute to the
authors that so few problems have come to light.

Only those problems which have arisen from the adoption of article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in Ohio are considered here. Article
9 deals with secured transactions and was probably the most thoroughly
studied and discussed of the nine substantive articles contained in the
Code. It should be noted that Ohio did not adopt the Uniform Commercial Code numbering system.' The provisions of article 9 are to be
found in chapter 1309 of the Revised Code of Ohio. Those who may
have occasion to examine decisions rendered in other jurisdictions or
literature upon the Code, as the author has done, may find the use of the
Ohio Revised Code numbering system a minor but annoying problem.
1. May 18, 1961.
2. July 1, 1962.
3. The Ohio Bankers Association sponsored a series of nine conferences on the Code in the
fall of 1961. The Ohio Legal Center conducted a series of four two and one half-day and
eight one-day seminars on the Code. Seminars were also held by individual bar associations.
4. Under the Ohio Revised Code numbering system article 1 is found in chapter 1301,
article 2 in chapter 1302, and so on. Section 1309.02(A) (2) of the Ohio Revised Code

would be Uniform Commercial Code section 9-102(1) (b).
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The problem areas arising from the adoption of article 9 may be
classified as those resulting from ambiguities, conflicts, or omissions in
the act as adopted in Ohio; those resulting from particular sections of
the act being made subject to or referring to non-Code Ohio law; and
those resulting from that portion of the act relating to transactions occurring prior to July 1, 1962.'
AMBIGUITIES, CONFLICTS, AND OMISSIONS

In this category there are three major areas worthy of note: motor
vehicles, default and deficiency, and fixtures.

Motor Vehicles - Ohio Revised Code Section 1309.21'
What appears to be a major conflict in the provisions of chapter
1309 of the Ohio Revised Code appears in section 1309.21. This section
isquite clear in stating that a financing statement must be filed to perfect
a security interest in a motor vehicle required to be licensed. Yet sections

1309.21 (C)-(D)' read as follows:
(C) The filing provisions of section 1309.01 to 1309.50, inclusive, of the Revised Code, do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a statute:
(2) of this state (including section 1701.66 of the Revised Code)
which provides for central filing of, or which requires indication on a
certificate of title of such security interests in such property or which
requires possession of a certificate of title.
(D) A security interest inproperty covered by division (C) of
this section can be perfected only by registration or filing under that
statute or by indication of the security interest on a certificate of title
or a duplicate thereof by a public official or by otherwise complying
with the procedure set forth in such statute.

At first examination it seems evident that this is a direct conflict.
Motor vehicles are required to be licensed in Ohio' and are also subject
to a statute which requires indication of security interests on or possession
of a certificate of tide.9 The conflict appears to be of lesser degree when
5. 129 Ohio Laws 13,182 (1961).
6. UCC § 9-302. Ohio Revised Code section 1309.21 provides:
"(A) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except the following:
(3) a purchase money security interest in farm equipment having a purchase price not
in excess of five hundred dollars; but filing is required for a fixture under section 1309.32
of the Revised Code or for a motor vehicle required to be licensed;
(4) a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing is required for a
fixture under section 1309.32 of the Revised Code or for a motor vehicle required to be
licensed..."

7. UCC §§ 9-302(3)-(4).
8. Omo REv. CODE ch. 4503.
9. OMIO REV. CODE § 4505.13.
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one considers that the Uniform Commercial Code was drafted for adoption
in all of the states, some having certificate of title acts and some notIn a state having no such certificate of title act, the Uniform CommerciaL
Code equivalent of Ohio Revised Code section 1309.21 (C) (2) would
be inapplicable and the filing of a financing statement to perfect a
security interest in a motor vehicle required to be licensed would be necessary under Uniform Commercial Code sections 9-302(1) (c)-(d).
The drafters of the Code sought to make it dear that no such conflict existed by stating in the official code comment to section 9-3(r2:
...many states have enacted certificate of title laws covering motor
vehicles and the like. If a certificate of title law requires the indication
of all security interests on the certificate, subsection (3) (b) exempts
transactions covered by the law from the filing requirements of this
article.10
The question presented by these apparently conflicting sections has
been resolved in the state of Pennsylvania by the decision in the case of:
Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank vs. Warren Lepley Ford, Incorporated.
(No. 2)." The court held in that case:
A notation on a certificate of title of a motor vehicle of a bank's
encumbrance thereon is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement
required under section 9-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, thereby
giving the bank a perfected security interest in the vehicle, and under
sections 9-201 and 9-303 this security interest is effective against the
receivers in equity of the owner of the vehicle so as to entitle the bank
to possession.' 2
This decision was based upon the 1952 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code. Although the sections considered were changed in the laterversion adopted in Ohio, the changes were not such as to have altered theabove decision.
That this same result was intended to be reached by the Ohio General'
Assembly is reflected by the provisions of Ohio Revised Code section:
4505.13, which was amended by the enactment of the Uniform Corn-mercial Code. This section states that chapter 1309 does not permit orrequire the filing of a security interest in a motor vehide."
The foregoing discussion is clearly applicable to motor vehicles forwhich a certificate of title is required to be issued. However, an even
more interesting problem arises out of Ohio Revised Code sections;
1309.21 (A) (3)-(4), (C) (2).'
Must a financing statement be filed
10. UCC § 9-302, comment 8.
11. 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 119 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1957).
12. Id. at 120.
13. Ohio Revised Code section 4505.13 provides: "Sections 1309.01 to 1309.50, inclusive,.
of the Revised Code, do not permit or require the deposit, filing, or other record of a securityinterest covering a motor vehicle .... "
14. UCC § 9-302(1) (c)-(d), (3) (b).
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to perfect a security interest in motor vehicles in the hands of a dealer?
Does it make any difference whether the vehicles are new or used? In
either event they are the dealer's inventory. This question arises by virtue of the fact that section 1309.21 (C) (2) applies only to property subject to a statute ".... which provides for central filing of, or which requires indication on a certificate of tide of such security interests in such
property or which requires possession of a certificate of title."'"
This problem is brought into sharper focus by decisions rendered in
Pennsylvania construing these sections as not exempting new or used
motor vehicles, held as inventory, from the filing requirements of the
Code.' 6 Possibly, as a result of these decisions, secured parties claiming
a security interest in the inventory of motor vehicle dealers located in
Ohio have been filing financing statements with the Secretary of State.
The Pennsylvania decisions, however, were based upon the motor
vehicle code of that state.' Under that act, motor vehicle dealers "...
need not obtain certificates of title for new motor vehicles ... until and
before sale thereof"' 8 and in the case of used cars, "... . shall not be required to apply for a certificate of title.. ."" but are required to notify
the department of the acquisition of the vehicle within ten days.
The Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Tide Act2 0 is somewhat different. A dealer may not sell or display for sale a used motor vehicle
without first having obtained a certificate of tide in his name.2 ' It would,
therefore, seem that the Pennsylvania decisions, in so far as they relate to
wsed motor vehicles, are inapplicable in Ohio.
The Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Tide Act does not require a
dealer to obtain a certificate of title upon new motor vehicles. He must
obtain a manufacturer's or importer's certificate. No mention of manufacturer's or importer's certificates is made in Ohio Revised Code sections
1309.21 (C) (2), (D).2 2 Are new motor vehicles, in the hands of a
15.

UCC § 9-302(3) (b), codified as Oo REv. CODE 1309.21(C) (2).

"16. Howarth v. Universal CIT, 203 F. Supp. 284 (W. D. Pa. 1962); Sterling Acceptance

'Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961); Taylor Motor Rental, Inc. v. Associates Discount Corp., 196 Pa. Super. 182, 173 A.2d 688 (1961); Girard Trust Corn Exch.
Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford Inc., (No. 1) 12 Pa. D. & C. 2d 351 (Philadelphia County

Ct. 1957).
17.
28.
19.
20.
21.

PA.STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 201(b), 207(c) (1960).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 201(b) (1960).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 207(c) (1960).
117 Ohio Laws 373 (1953), codified as OMIO REV. CODE ch. 4505.
Ohio Revised Code section 4505.18 provides:
"No person shall:

(B) Display for sale or sell as a dealer or acting on behalf of a dealer, a motor vehicle without having obtained a manufacurer's or importer's certificate or a certificate of title therefor
as provided in sections 4505.01 to 4505.19, inclusive, of the Revised Code ...

22.

UCC §§ 9-302(3) (b), (4).
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dealer, for which no certificate of title is required, exempt by the provision of section 1309.21 (C) (2), (D) from the filing requirements of
the Uniform Commercial Code? From an examination of that section
alone it would appear that they are not.
However, two other sections must be considered. Ohio Revised
Code section 1309.26(A)" permits a buyer in the ordinary course of
business to take free of a security interest created by his seller even though
he has knowledge of the security interest and it has been perfected. However, by virtue of section 1309.26(C) 2 4 this is not applicable with respect to a security interest in motor vehicles ". . . as defined in section
4505.01 of the Revised Code."25 Note that this exception is not limited
to motor vehicles for which a certificate of title is required. Section
1309.26(C) is peculiar to Ohio; it is not contained in the uniform act.
Ohio Revised Code section 4505.13 is a statute dealing with a specific
subject, security interests in motor vehicles. Under the rules of statutory
construction the specific must prevail over the general.26 Section 4505.13
provides in part:
Sections 1309.01 to 1309.50, inclusive, of the Revised Code, do not
permit or require the deposit, filing, or other record of a security interest
covering a motor vehicle. Any security agreement covering a security
interest in a motor vehicle, if such instrument is accompanied by delivery of a manufacturer's or importer's certificate and followed by actual
and continued possession of such certificate by the holder of said instrument, or, in the case of a certificate of title, if a notation of such instrument has been made by the clerk of the court of common pleas on the
face of such certificate, shall be valid as against the creditors of the
debtor, whether armed with process or not, and against subsequent
purchasers, secured parties, and other lienholders or claimaints.
The intent of the Ohio legislature in enacting 1961 Amended Senate
Bill No. 527 seems clearly to have been to require possession of a manufacturer's certificate of origin or notation on a certificate of title as the
means of perfecting a security interest in motor vehicles and not the filing
of a financing statement.
23.

UCC § 9-307(1). Ohio Revised Code section 1309.26(A) provides:
"A buyer in ordinary course of business, as defined in division (I) of section 1301.01 of
the Revised Code, other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security
interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence."
24. This section provides:
"The provisions of divisions (A) and (B) of this section shall not apply to a security interest in motor vehicles as defined in section 4505.01 of the Revised Code."
25. Ohio Revised Code section 4505.01 provides:
"As used in sections 4505.01 to 4505.19, inclusive, of the Revised Code, 'motor vehicle'
includes house trailers or house semitrailers designed for human habitation and trailers and
semitrailers whose weight exceeds four thousand pounds ......
26. 50 OHio JULR. 2d, Statutes § 10 (1961) provides:
"Thus, a special statute covering a particular subject matter must be read as an exception to
a statute covering the same and other subjects in general terms."
27. 120 Ohio Laws 13 (1961).
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Default and Deficiency
All sections of Ohio Revised Code chapter 1319 relating to chattel
mortgages were repealed by the enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, except sections 1319.0628 and 1319.07.
Section 1319.07 thus remains the law on and after July 1, 1962.
This section prohibits a chattel mortgagee, who has repossessed his security before foreclosure, from obtaining a deficiency judgment, unless
he has given at least ten-days notice of the time, place, and minimum
price for which the property may be sold together with a statement that
the mortgagor may be liable for any deficiency.
Section 1309.4729 relates to disposition of collateral by the secured
party upon default. Notice of disposition is not required under this section if the collateral is perishable, threatens to decline rapidly in value,
or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market. In all other
cases, -reasonablenotice of the time and place of any public sale or of the
time after which a private sale or other disposition is to be made is required. There is no minimum time established by section 1309.47 for
the notice, as in section 1319.07.
The failure to repeal section 1319.07 was not an oversight for an
additional subsection 0 was added to section 1309.47 making the same
subject to the limitations of section 1319.07.
This apparent conflict raises certain problems. Must a secured party
give ten-days notice prior to disposition of the collateral in all cases before he may recover a deficiency judgment? Does this limitation apply
to all transactions regardless of form or is it limited to those in which a
chattel mortgage is used or the security agreement by its provisions
equates a chattel mortgage type transaction? Is the limitation meaningless as we no longer have chattel mortgages under the Ohio Revised Code?
This problem is peculiar to the Uniform Commercial Code as it was
adopted in Ohio. Thus, a review of decisions from other states relating
to the Code will be of no avail.
There should be no question that the legislature of Ohio intended the
limitations of section 1319.07 to apply to the secured party in at least
some instances.
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, the provisions of section 1319.07 applied only to chattel mortgagees. They did
Ohio Revised Code section 1319.06 provides:
"No husband or wife shall create any lien by chattel mortgage or otherwise upon any personal household property owned by either or both of them, without the joint consent of both
husband and wife. No such mortgage is valid unless executed by both husband and wife.
'This section does not apply to any mortgage or lien for the purchase price of such property."
29. UCC § 9-504.
30. OHio REv. CODE § 1309A7 (F).
28.
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not apply to conditional vendors, assignors of accounts receivable, or secured parties under the trust receipts or factors lien acts. The language
of the section cited has not been changed. By its terms a chattel mortgagee may not recover a deficiency unless the required notice has been
given.
The terms "debtor" and "secured party" have been substituted for
"mortgagor, " 'tmortgagee," "conditional vendor," and "conditional vendee."'" If the legislature had intended the limitations to apply to all
secured parties, it would have used that term. 2 The legislature must be
presumed to know the meaning of the language which it uses."3 The
term "mortgagee" has had a fixed meaning in the law for many years
prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code as has the term
"chattel mortgage." A chattel mortgage is a transfer of the title of personal property as security for a debt.34
These factors would lead us to believe that only when the secured
party qualifies as a chattel mortgagee should the limitations of 1319.07
apply. Under the above definition this would occur when the debtor
has transferred title to the collateral as security. Although this procedure is not required under the Code, neither is it prohibited. When this
method of financing is followed, regardless of the designation given the
instrument (security agreement-chattel mortgage), the secured party is
a "chattel mortgagee."
This conclusion is bolstered by the rules of statutory construction
which provide that "the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute
must be determined primarily from the language of the statute itself."3"
It is interesting to note, however, that of the statutes pertaining to
chattel mortgages, only two have been retained. Of one of these, Ohio
Revised Code section 1319.07, it has been said that the legislative "intendment is against deficiency judgment."36 The other, Ohio Revised
Code section 1319.06, protects the consumer in a loan upon household
furnishings. Could it be that the legislature intended to provide protection for consumers against deficiency judgment? If that is the case, the
provisions of section 1319.07 would apply against any secured party, regardless of the form of transaction, when the debtor was a consumer.
The legislature should clarify the confusion raised by its present enactment.
31.
32.

UCC § 9-105, comment 1.
50 OHIo JuR. 2d, Statutes § 173 (1961).

33.

Ibid.

34.
35.
36.

Tufts v. Haynie, 4 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 494 (Cir. Ct. 1890).
50 OHiO JuR. 2d, Statutes § 170 (1961).
Welfare Fin. Co. v. Unger, 174 N.E.2d 117, 119 (Ohio App. 1960).
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Fixtures
Ohio Revised Code section 1309.32 (A) 37 provides that the Uniform
Commercial Code and the rules of the fixture provisions thereof do not
apply to
...
goods

incorporated into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks,

tile, cement, glass, metal work, and the like and no security interest in
them exists under section 1309.01 to 1309.50, inclusive, of the Revised
Code unless the structure remains personal property under applicable
law.
The determination as to whether and when other goods become fixtures is left to the law of this state other than the Uniform Commercial
Code."8 Leaving such determination to non-Code law will create problems for the secured party who must classify collateral as real, personal,
or fixture property at the time he undertakes to perfect his security interest.3" There are no clear-cut rules in chapter 1309 of the Ohio Revised Code to aid him in determining what is a fixture.
It is also questionable whether the pre-Uniform Commercial Code
decisions under Ohio law in the area of fixtures will be of any great assistance in defining a Code fixture.
The term "fixture" seems to have been most dearly defined in the
leading Ohio case of Teaff v. Hewitt40 where the court stated:
A removable fixture as a term of general application is a solecism
- a contradiction in words. There does not appear to be any necessity
or propriety in classifying movable articles which may be for temporary
purposes somewhat attached to the land, under any general denomination distinguishing them from other chattel property.4 1
A fixture is an article which was a chattel, but which by being
physically annexed or affixed to the realty, became accessory to itand
part and parcel of

it.2

The criteria set forth in that decision in determining a fixture are:
First: Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto.
Second: Appropriation to the use or purpose of that part of the realty
with which it is connected. Third: The intention of the party making
the annexation, to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold - this intention being inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation,

37. UCC § 9-313(1).
38. Ohio Revised Code section 1309.32 provides:
"rhe law of this state other than Chapters 1301., 1302., 1303., 1304., 1305., 1306., 1307.,
1308., and 1309. of the Revised Code, determines whether and when other goods become

fixtures."
39. Omo REv. CODE §§ 1309.38(A) (2), .39(A),UCC §§ 9-401(1) (b), -402(1).
40. Teaff v.Hewitt, I Ohio St. 511 (1853).
41. Id. at 524-25.
42. Id. at 527.
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the annexation, the structure and mode of annexation,
and the purpose
43

or use for which the annexation has been made.

This definition and these criteria for determining what is a fixture
have been cited and applied in many Ohio decisions. 4 In accord with
the criteria established, the courts of Ohio have held that property annexed to lands may, as between certain parties, be regarded as part of the
realty, while, in respect to other parties, the same thing may be treated as
retaining its character as personalty."
Ohio Revised Code section 1309.32 deals with interests of a secured
party in goods attached to realty as opposed to interests claimed in such
realty. Thus, we should consider the law of fixtures in Ohio as it has
been applied between these parties. Such interest in the realty may be
held as purchaser, mortgagee (prior or subsequent to the interest claimed
in the chattel), judgment creditor, or other lienor.48
It is recognized in Ohio that an agreement that goods annexed to
realty are to remain chattels is binding upon a subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee if he has knowledge of the agreement. This is qualified by
the condition that the property must be removable without material injury to the realty or to itself.47 However, in the absence of notice, the
claim of the vendor of chattels annexed to realty under such an agreement
will not prevail against a purchaser of the realty.48
Prior to the Holland Furnace case49 the courts of Ohio consistently
held that sellers of personal property under a conditional sales contract
or chattel mortgage would prevail over the interest of a prior mortgagee
where the chattel could be removed without material injury to the realty
or the chattel.5" However, this was not so where material injury would
result.5"
The Holland Furnace case stands as authority for the proposition

that a prior mortgagee without notice of a conditional sales contract, who
is also a bona fide purchaser for value, has priority over the conditional
seller of a furnace. In that case the mortgagee of the realty foreclosed
and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. The court found the
filing of a conditional sales contract under the statutes pertaining thereto
43. Id. at 530.
44. 24 Omo Jin. 2d, Fixtures § 2 (1957).
45. Wagner v. Cleveland & T. R. Co., 22 Ohio St. 563 (1872).
46. 24 OHIO JtJR. 2d, Fixtures, § 20 (1957).
47. Id. § 24, citing XXth Century Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Home Owner's Loan Corp.,
56 Ohio App. 188, 10 N.E.2d 229 (1937).
48. Brennan v. Whitaker, 15 Ohio St. 446 (1864).
49. Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 N.E.2d 273

(1939).
50. 14 OHIo Op. 164 (1939).
51.

Concrete Silo Co. v. Warstler, 50 Ohio App. 334, 198 N.E. 189 (1935).
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65

not to be constructive notice to the holder of an interest in the realty. The
decision was confined to the facts in that case, which involved the "rights
of a subsequent purchaser for value, without notice."5
A subsequent mortgagee of the realty takes priority over the conditional seller or chattel mortgagee of chattels annexed to realty if the
chattel is of such nature that it is likely to become incorporated into the
real estate."3
From the foregoing it will appear that whether an article is a fixture
will depend in great part upon its amenability to being removed without
material damage to the realty or itself.
Compare the Ohio case law with the concept of a fixture set forth in
Ohio Revised Code section 1309.32." 4 A fixture is neither real nor personal property under section 1309.32." 5 A security interest in a fixture
may be created separate and apart from the realty to which it is attached.
Yet, a purchaser of the realty buys such property with the real estate
when he has neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the interest of a
third person in the fixture. A fixture is a hybrid form of property being
part personal and part real.
When a secured party, having an interest in the fixture, has priority
under section 1309.32 over the claims of all persons having an interest
in the realty, upon default he may remove his collateral from the realty
without liability for a dimunition in the value of the real estate resulting
therefrom.5" He must, of course, pay for the cost of repair of any physical
injury caused by the removal. The right of removal exists regardless of
injury to the freehold."
This concept of a fixture under the Code will be new to Ohio law.
The courts will be called upon to lay down rules distinguishing between
goods incorporated into the structure and those affixed to real estate in
such manner that they become fixtures under the Code requisites. The old
tests of attachment in such manner that identity as a chattel is lost or in
such manner that it cannot be removed without damage to itself or the
freehold would no longer seem to be decisive. Furthermore, filing under
the Code is constructive notice in regard to Code fixtures.
The importance of the determination as to whether goods are "fix52. Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 57, 19 N.X.2d 273,
277 (1939).
53. 24 Omo Jtnt. 2d, Fixtures § 24 (1957).
54. A full discussion of the many problems relating to fixtures -will be found in Coogan,
Security Interests in Fixtures under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1319
(1962).
55. UCC S 9-313.
56. OIo REV. CODE § 1309.32(E), UCC § 9-313(5).
57. Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARv.
L. REV. 1319, 1346 (1962).
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tures" arises from the filing requirements of the Code. If the collateral
is or is to become a fixture, the instrument filed must contain a description of the real estate concerned 8 and must be filed in the office where
a mortgage on the real estate concerned would be recorded."0 As filing
public notice is one of the requisites for obtaining a perfected security
interest, proper filing in all cases is desired.6" Can this be accomplished
when the Code sets forth no clear-cut definition of a fixture, but leaves
the same to be decided by a jury, perhaps years after the time of filing?
Descriptionof Real Estate Concerned
The requirement that the instrument filed contain a description of the
real estate concerned 6 presents its own problems. It may be that the
real estate to which the goods are to be annexed is unknown. The
secured party, taking the position that it is impossible to have a fixture
until the realty is known, files as though the collateral were ordinary
goods, not fixtures. If the collateral were classifield as business equipment or inventory, the filing might be made only with the Secretary of
State.
When, at a later date, the goods are annexed to a parcel of real
estate, can the secured party claim that he perfected his security interest
in the only way possible at the time and that it remains perfected even
though later affixed to real estate? He would find some support in
Ohio Revised Code section 1309.38 (C)"3 which provides:
A filing which is made in the proper place in this state continues
effective even though the debtor's residence or place of business or the
location of the collateral or its use, whichever controlled the original
filing, is thereafter changed.

Such a conclusion can give little comfort to examiners of real estate
titles. However, such persons and county recorders have another problem which should be called to their attention. Ohio Revised Code section
1309.39,4 in setting forth the formal requisites of a financing statement,
does not require the name of the record owner of the real estate to be
shown on the financing statement.65 This will present no problem when
the debtor and the record owner of the realty are one and the same.
58. OHIo REV. CODE § 1309.39(A), UCC § 9-402(1).
59. OHIO REV. CODE § 1309.38(A) (2), UCC § 9-401(1) (b).
60. The requisites for obtaining a perfected security interest are that: there be an agreement
that it attach, value be given, the debtor have rights in the collateral, and public notice be given.
61. OHIo REV. CODE § 1309.39(A), UCC § 9-402(1).
62. OHIo REv. CODE § 1309.38, UCC 5 9-401.
63. UCC 5 9-401 (3).
64. UCC § 9-402.
65. Ohio Revised Code section 1309.39 (A) requires that a financing statement be signed by
the debtor and secured party, give an address for each, and contain a statement indicating the
types or describing the collateral.
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Consider the situation in which a contractor or subcontractor purchases
an item for installation on a specific parcel of realty. He purchases the
same on a conditional contract. In filing the financing statement will
the secured party show the name of the owner of the realty? If so,
will it be conspicuous enough for the county recorder to note and index
it accordingly? If not, how can the tide examiner be expected to discover
such a security interest when it is indexed in the name of the debtor contractor?
The filing officer is required to index each financing statement according to the name of the debtor. 6 This author finds no requirement
for indexing in the name of the record owner of real estate.
Place of Filing
The Code is clear that financing statements covering goods which
are or are to become fixtures at the time the security interest attaches
are to be filed in the office where a mortgage on the real estate concerned is to be recorded."T In Ohio this is in the office of the county
recorder of the county in which the land is located. However, shall
such filings be recorded as real estate encumbrances and so indexed or
filed as chattel filings and so indexed? If such filings are to fulfill the
purpose of alerting examiners of real estate titles and persons dealing
with or claiming an interest in the reality to the existence of security
interests in property affixed thereto, they must be filed among the real
estate records. That this was intended is indicated by the requirement
that the instrument filed contain a description of the real estate concerned. The author has been informed that Ohio county recorders are
filing financing statements covering fixtures as chattel filings and so
indexing them. In at least one county6" a separate index of fixture filings
is maintained with the real estate records, but the instruments themselves are filed among the chattel filings.
If it was intended that fixture filings be made among the realty records, some clarification is required.
Prior to the enactment of Ohio Revised Code chapter 1309, a
mortgage, upon both real and personal property, could be recorded as a
real estate mortgage and also indexed as a chattel mortgage under the
provisions of pre-Code section 1319.02. This section was repealed by
the Code. There is now no authority for recording as both a chattel and
a real estate mortgage. The duration of a filing under chapter 1309 is
five years unless an earlier maturity date is stated. 9 If a real estate
66. Omo REv. CODE 5 1309A0(D), UCC § 9-403(4).

5

67.
68.

OHIO REV. CODE
Franklin County.

1309.38 (A) (2), UCC § 9-401(b).

69.

OIo REv. CODE § 1309.40(B), UCC § 9-403(2).
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mortgagee also wishes to cover fixtures under section 1309.3270 for the
same period as the life of the real estate mortgage, it will be necessary
to repeat such filings regularly. This problem could be eliminated by
the re-enactment of section 1319.02 in amended form.
REFERENCES TO NON-CODE LAW

Section 1309.1771
The matters falling in this category should properly be designated
questions as to what is the Ohio law, and what is its effect on the Uniform Commercial Code where reference is made thereto, rather than
problems wrought by the Code.
The first reference is found in Ohio Revised Code section 1309.17.
This section validates agreements by a buyer not to assert against an
assignee any claim or defense which he may have against his seller,
but only as to defenses which could be cut off if a negotiable instrument
were used. This section is made "subject to any statute or decision which
establishes a different rule for buyers of consumer goods."
An examination of the statutes and reported decisions relative to this
subject in Ohio fails to disclose any distinction between buyers of consumer goods and other buyers with respect to such agreements. The
courts of Ohio have found finance companies and others regularly discounting consumer paper not to be holders in due course."2 However, it
has generally been recognized that they may be holders in due course."h
If such assignees are consistently held to be holders in due course when
the debtor is a consumer, the agreement not to assert defenses will be
meaningless.
Section 1309.29'4
Ohio Revised Code section 1309.29 gives priority to the lien of one
furnishing services or materials with respect to goods subject to a
security interest over a perfected security interest."h This rule is subject
to a few qualifications. The services must have been rendered in the
ordinary course of business. The lien must be upon goods in the posses70. UCC § 9-313.
71. UCC S 9-206.
72. Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950).
73. Springfield Loan Co. v. National Guar. & Fin. Co., 27 N.E.2d 257 (Ohio Ct. App. 1939).
74. UCC § 9-310.
75. Ohio Revised Code section 1309.29 provides:
"When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or materials with
respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority over a perfected
security interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise."
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sion of the person rendering the service or furnishing the materials. Such
lien takes priority, unless the lien is statutory and the statute granting
the lien expressly provides otherwise.
Statutory liens in Ohio are dealt with in chapter 1311 of the Ohio
Revised Code."6 A review of these liens does not reflect any statute
providing that a perfected security interest shall take priority over the
lien granted by that statute. Section 1309.29 is most often questioned
in respect to garagemen's liens for services rendered upon motor vehicles.
The garageman's lien is a common-law lien. 7 It is not one granted by
statute. Thus, the "unless" clause contained in Ohio Revised Code section
1309.29 is not applicable to a garageman's lien, and that section has the
effect of giving a garageman's lien priority over a perfected security interest.
Does the Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act affect the provisions of section 1309.29? No decisions directly in point on the question of the priority of a garageman's lien over a mortgage lien recorded
on a certificate of title can be found. There are decisions holding that
a chattel mortgage recorded prior to the services performed by the
garageman will take priority over the artisan's lien in the absence of
consent by the mortgagee to performance of the work.78 However, these
decisions were rendered prior to the enactment of the Certificate of Motor
Vehicle Title Act.
Ohio Revised Code section 4505.04, dealing with certificates of title,
has been construed to prevent the proof of any claim or interest in a
motor vehicle by the actual owner of the vehicle' in the absence of
presentation of the certificate of title, proof of equitable claims," or a
bailee's interest.8
Two decisions arising under section 4505.04 are worthy of note.
In Schiefer v. Schnaufer82 the court held that a mechanic with a validly
recorded Indiana garageman's lien could not prevail against a purchaser
76. Ohio Revised Code sections 1311.02-.38 deal with the mechanics Hens; Ohio Revised
Code sections 1311.39-.47 deal with liens of railroad subcontractors; Ohio Revised Code sections 1311.48-.51 deal with liens for care of animals; Ohio Revised Code sections 1311.65-.68
deal with public works liens; and Ohio Revised Code section 1307.15 deals with the lien of
the warehouseman.
77. 9 OHIO JUR. 2d, Chattel Mortgages § 103 (1954).
78. Id. § 104, citing Metropolitan Secs. Co. v. Orlow, 107 Ohio St. 583, 140 N.E. 306
(1923); Cleveland Auto Top & Trimming Co. v. American Fin. Co., 124 Ohio St. 169,
177 N.E. 217 (1931).
79. Kelley Car Co. v. Finlder, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951); Mielke v. Leeberson, 150 Ohio St. 528, 83 N.E.2d 209 (1948).
80. Butler v. Case, 161 Ohio St. 288, 118 N.E.2d 836 (1954); Garlick v. McFarland, 159
Ohio St 539, 113 N.B2d 92 (1953); Finance Co. v. Munday, 137 Ohio St 504, 30 N.E.2d
1002 (1940).
81. Peitsmeyer v. Omar Baking Co., 95 Ohio App. 37, 117 N.E.2d 184 (1952).
82. 71 Ohio App. 431, 50 N.E.2d 365 (1943).
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in Ohio holding a certificate of title which contained no notation of the
lien. In that case the Indiana owner brought the car to Ohio and obtained a certificate of title before selling the vehicle.
In the case of Justice v. Bussard,8" it was held that the common-law
lien of an artisan from repairs to an automobile is not abolished by section 4505.04. However, that suit involved the artisan and the owner of
the vehicle, not a holder of a certificate-noted lien.
In view of the explicit language of section 4505.04 and the decision
law, the last case would seem to state a rather doubtful rule. The decisions based on section 4505.04 would seem to follow pre-certificate of
title decisions, that a recorded (noted on certificate of title) chattel
mortgage will take priority over an artisan's lien.
Section 1309.29 reverses this rule with respect to non-certificate of
title collateral. The decisions under section 4505.04 and the language
of section 4505.13 point to the conclusion that section 1309.29 will not
change the pre-Code Ohio law, that a garageman's lien will not take
priority over a prior lien noted upon a certificate of title.
Section 1309.29 will give priority to statutory and other commonlaw liens over perfected security interests. Persons protected by such
liens in Ohio include artisans, tradesmen, mechanics, and laborers who
receive property for the purpose of mending, repairing, and improving
its condition.8"
PRE-CODE TRANSACTIONS

The Uniform Commercial Code contains a tenth article. This
article deals with the effective date and repealer. Uniform Commercial
Code section 10-101 reads: "This Act shall become effective at midnight
on December 31st following its enactment. It applies to transactions
entered into and events occurring after that date."
Ohio did not adopt this provision. In an attempt at clarification the
following language was substituted: 5
This act shall take effect on July 1, 1962.
Transactions validly entered into before such date and the rights,
duties and interests flowing from them remain valid thereafter and may be
terminated, completed, consummated or enforced as required or per-

mitted by any statute or other law amended or repealed by this Act as
though such repeal or amendment had not occurred.
Instruments, documents, or notices filed prior to July 1, 1962, in
accordance with the law at the time of such filings shall be deemed to
be filed under section one of this Act as of the original date of filing
83.
84.
85.

114 N.E.2d 305 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1953).
34 OHIO JUR. 2d, Liens § 17 (1958).
129 Ohio Laws 13, 182 (1961).
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and may be continued or terminated as provided in section one of this
act.

The questions which have arisen are: (1) Do pre-Code filings still
effective on July 1, 1962, become effective for the time prescribed in
the Uniform Commercial Code, to wit, five years? (2) Is the old cancellation form or the new termination form to be used? (3) Since
the Uniform Commercial Code provides for a one dollar fee for termination of filings, may county recorders charge such fee for cancellation of
existing pre-Code filings?
These problems have been presented to the Attorney General of Ohio
and he has ruled thereon. To date this opinion stands as the only authority on these questions.8" Decisions rendered in other states would
not be relevant as the language considered is peculiar to Ohio.
The Attorney General has ruled that instruments and documents filed
and effective as of July 1, 1962, will be effective for five years from the
original date of filing. Such filings must be continued or terminated
under the new law, and county recorders may charge the new fee of one
dollar for such termination.
SUMMARY

New problems have arisen as a result of the adoption of article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code in Ohio. Except in the area of fixtures,
these problems arise not from the Code but from peculiarities in Ohio
law, notably the Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act. In the area of
fixtures the Ohio courts will be called upon to give new meaning to the
term "fixtures" as it is used in the Code. Some practical problems
have arisen as demonstrated by the questions considered by the Attorney
General. On the whole, however, a period of over five months under
article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code has demonstrated it to be
workable and containing fewer problems than anticipated.
86.
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